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INTRODUCTION
Much analysis of sovereign debt restructuring focuses on distributional conflict 
between sovereign debtors and their creditors. There is also an analytical 
tendency to see creditors as a relatively homogenous group with like interests. 
In reality, however, there is considerable diversity among creditors. Different 
types of creditors have different political and financial claims and thus different 
— at times, divergent or conflictive — interests. This means that the burden-
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sharing exercise of sovereign debt restructuring is 
played out not just between debtors and creditors, but 
also, importantly, between different types of creditors. 
We should emphasize that the private sector approach 
centred on CACs — even the newer, stronger CACs 
recently adopted by Kazakhstan and Mexico — is not 
sufficient to solve the myriad problems associated with 
sovereign debt restructuring. Among other things, 
CACs do not guarantee the enforcement of priority 
agreements, address debtor-in-possession financing, 
or even eliminate the problem of “holdout” creditors 
(Bolton 2003; Buchheit et al. 2013). Nor do they 
address ex ante concerns, such as the tendency to delay 
necessary debt restructurings (Gitlin and House 2014; 
International Monetary Fund [IMF] 2013b), or ensure 
that the debtor is not still left with an unsustainable debt 
burden after restructuring. This brief will elaborate on 
several of these issues below.
The purpose, here, is not to analyze the strengths 
and weaknesses of various approaches or endorse 
one over another, but rather to focus on a few of the 
effects of incomplete contracts and the absence of a 
more comprehensive sovereign bankruptcy regime 
in terms of inter-creditor and debtor-creditor equity 
and the related issues of efficiency in sovereign debt 
restructuring.
Most discussions of inter-creditor issues vis-à-vis 
sovereign debt restructuring focus on the collective 
action problems that lead to individually and collectively 
suboptimal outcomes. From a game-theoretic 
perspective, several studies show the positive-sum 
logic of inter-creditor and debtor-creditor coordination 
in preventing and resolving sovereign debt crises (for an 
overview, see Rogoff and Zettlemeyer 2002; Pitchford 
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and Wright 2010).1 Some studies also highlight, or at 
least imply, that creditor interests are often relatively 
aligned with debtor interests, insofar as both groups 
want to avoid crises and, when they occur, resolve them 
with minimal disruption, even if that means the “early 
and rapid restructuring of unsustainable sovereign debt” 
(Krueger 2012, 199; IMF 2014b). This, of course, is not 
always the case, in particular when creditor groups are 
non-homogenous. In many cases, significant conflicts of 
interest exist and can undermine inter-creditor, as well 
as debtor-creditor, equity and cooperation during debt 
restructurings. 
This policy brief draws on a joint workshop with 
Columbia University on Frameworks for Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring, held in New York on November 17, 
2014. It does not address anything close to the full range 
of issues discussed there. Instead, it narrows in on a 
specific set of salient issues that affect debt restructuring 
processes and outcomes: those related to inter-creditor 
and creditor-debtor equity. It also offers a few policy 
considerations for beginning to resolve these issues in 
ways that contribute to fairer and more effective debt 
restructurings. 
THE ROLE OF SCDSs
Since 2008, there has been rapid growth in the use of 
SCDSs, especially in advanced economies where new 
concerns about debt sustainability have been raised (IMF 
2013a). Many investors use SCDSs to hedge against the 
risk of sovereign default and protect their assets in the 
event of a debt restructuring. But SCDSs are also used 
to speculate on the likelihood of default — an activity 
that some fear could have “destabilizing effects on the 
1 From these perspectives, the problem is that even when cooperation is 
“Pareto superior,” it may not be achieved due to informational asymmetries 
and other constraints on collective action.
financial system” (ibid). In October 2011, to mitigate this 
risk, the European Union (EU) banned the purchase of 
credit default swap contracts on sovereign bonds that 
the buyer does not hold — i.e., when she or he is not 
hedging (Ruffoni 2014). Since then, SCDS trading in 
the European Union has declined markedly. The data 
suggest, however, that much of this speculative activity 
has simply shifted into emerging market debt (ibid.). 
The widespread use of SCDSs contradicts the notion 
that creditors necessarily want to avoid sovereign 
defaults and, when they occur, seek to reach prompt and 
fair restructuring agreements. As international law firm 
Allen & Overy (2011, 17) observes, “buyers of protection 
will generally want a credit event to happen.” When 
such an event triggers or necessitates debt restructuring, 
not all creditors will necessarily share the same incentive 
to reach a timely and fair debt workout. Some creditors 
(with small or non-existent SCDS positions) will have a 
strong incentive to reach agreement, while others (with 
large SCDS positions) will have a far weaker incentive 
(Guzman and Stiglitz 2014). The disjuncture between 
different creditors’ incentive structures is made worse 
by the fact that bondholders involved in a restructuring 
are not obliged to disclose their SCDS positions. 
These conflicts of interest threaten to exacerbate the 
problem of holdout creditors by further incentivizing 
non-cooperation in debt restructuring negotiations. 
This is especially worrying in the wake of the recent 
Argentina-related litigation, which, by giving holdouts 
a new strategy to pursue full repayment and block 
the repayment of those who agreed to a restructuring, 
threatens to increase the incentive to hold out from 
future restructuring deals. Imagine: in the event of a 
debt restructuring, holdouts with large SCDS positions 
could sue for repayment and, if successful, cash in twice. 
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In addition to holdout creditors, it has long been 
recognized that distressed debtors tend to postpone 
the restructuring process and, when it can be delayed 
no longer, seek insufficient debt relief from their 
creditors. The 2012 Greek restructuring is widely cited 
as an exemplar of this “too little, too late” problem (IMF 
2013b; Gitlin and House 2014). The policy fix would be 
to have debtors and their creditors come together at an 
early stage (when debt servicing difficulties first become 
apparent) and seek to restore debt sustainability. Early 
restructuring could help stave off default and a deeper 
restructuring in the future, thus providing benefits to 
both debtors and creditors. But creditors that hold 
SCDSs will have little reason to cooperate with other 
creditors and with debtors to avert future crises. The 
logic of a voluntary “upfront” restructuring only makes 
sense if creditors fear they will incur larger losses in 
the event of a future crisis. The purchase of SCDSs 
dampens such fear and, with it, the incentive to seek 
early resolution of sovereign debt difficulties, which is 
already very difficult to achieve. The use of SCDSs could 
thus further sever the link between inter-creditor and 
debtor-creditor interests in sovereign debt restructuring.
SHORT-TERM VERSUS LONG-TERM 
CREDITORS 
Balancing the interests of short-term and long-term 
holders of sovereign debt also raises issues of inter-
creditor equity. Restructurings tend to affect only 
holders of some bond issuances or series, rather than all 
bondholders. 
A key distinction exists between creditors whose claims 
will reach maturity during a debt crisis or IMF program 
(short-term claims) and those with longer-term claims 
that will not mature for several years. The distribution 
of losses between these two generic types of creditor 
depends on the way in which a debt crisis is resolved. 
Traditional debt crises begin with a bailout. In bailouts, 
short-term creditors escape relatively unscathed. The 
IMF comes to fill the spot left by the creditors it bailed 
out. Since the IMF is de facto a senior creditor and, as 
such, is almost always paid back on time and in full, the 
longer-term creditors who “stayed in” (who typically 
had no choice but to stay in) are pushed further down 
on the creditor food chain (which determines who gets 
paid, on what terms and when). 
By contrast, in more recent crises when there has been a 
“bail-in,” it is typically the shorter-term claimants who 
bear the brunt of the restructuring, as it is their claims 
that are coming due at the same time the sovereign is 
experiencing difficulty servicing its debt. They must 
therefore reschedule and/or accept a face-value loss on 
their claim.
Clearly, then, the method of treatment determines which 
creditors win and lose — relatively speaking — during 
a sovereign debt crisis. 
FOREIGN VERSUS DOMESTIC 
CREDITORS
The nationality of bondholders — in particular, whether 
they are foreigners or domestic residents — can also be 
an important determinant in the differential treatment 
of creditors. For example, domestic and foreign creditors 
were treated differently in the most recent restructurings 
of Argentina, Jamaica, Dominica, Russia and Uruguay, 
to name but a few cases. There are a number of reasons 
why sovereigns might want to discriminate for or 
against domestic or foreign creditors in their debt 
restructuring strategies (Erce 2013). 
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First, residents are subject to the domestic legal and 
regulatory system, making them easier to persuade or 
coerce into participating in a debt exchange. Second, 
a sovereign may choose to honour its external debt 
obligations while restructuring its domestic ones in 
order to retain access to international capital markets 
— a particularly attractive strategy for states with 
underdeveloped domestic financial markets. Third, a 
sovereign may choose to restructure its external debt 
obligations while remaining current on its domestic 
ones in order to mitigate the domestic financial 
fallout that could result from defaulting on and/or 
restructuring claims held by local banks and businesses. 
Finally, domestic residents may have more influence 
than foreigners over their governments’ decision 
making and, thus, a greater ability to shape outcomes 
that favour domestic creditors (ibid.).2 
As these examples show, inequity between foreign 
and domestic creditors can be a contentious aspect of 
sovereign debt restructuring, with a direct impact on 
the perceived fairness and efficacy of various crisis 
resolution strategies. Pari passu clauses were designed 
to impede such discrimination, but as evinced by 
the recent Argentina litigation, these clauses can be 
interpreted and applied in ways that deviate from their 
original intent (Burn 2014; Gilsinan 2014).
2 There are two further complications. First, if, on average, the debt 
contracts with foreigners and domestic creditors differ, any discussion of 
how to treat different classes of creditors becomes, de facto, a discussion of 
how to treat foreigners versus domestic creditors. For instance, if domestic 
creditors lend in domestic currency and foreigners in dollars, then a decision 
about exchange rates is de facto a discussion about treatment of foreign 
versus domestic creditors. Second, domestic borrowers inevitably are subject 
to the country’s own tax and expenditure programs, which may make up, 
for instance, for some of the losses that might occur in a debt restructuring. 
Foreign creditors may be partially compensated by their governments 
through the tax system as well. 
PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC 
CREDITORS
Private and public — or commercial and official — 
creditors also often receive differential treatment in 
sovereign debt restructurings (Mandeng 2004). There 
is no clear logic as to which group (public or private 
creditors) will generally receive more favourable 
treatment. Official bilateral, multilateral and private 
sector treatments will be briefly compared. 
The Paris Club of official bilateral creditors grants debt 
relief on the “comparability of treatment” principle, 
meaning that any debtor who receives treatment from 
the Paris Club must also seek comparable debt relief 
from its other bilateral official and private creditors.3 
The problem, however, is that securing comparable 
concessions from commercial creditors (who had no 
input in the Paris Club deal) can be difficult. Obtaining 
comparable treatment is further complicated by the fact 
that official and private creditors “do not share common 
rules to value concessions in debt restructuring” 
(ibid., 18). 
In a more specific example, private creditors have not 
shared equally in the burden of the substantial debt 
relief offered by the IMF, World Bank and Paris Club 
under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative 
(MDRI). In fact, many private creditors whose claims 
were repudiated or restructured during these initiatives 
have successfully sued (or threatened to sue) for full 
repayment.4 According to the Paris Club, such litigation 
3 See www.clubdeparis.org/sections/composition/principes/
comparabilite-traitement.
4 At the end of 2007, total claims from litigating creditors were worth 
US$1.5 billion, US$1.2 billion of which had already been awarded by the 
courts (see www.clubdeparis.org/sections/themes-strategiques/2009-8217-
action-du-club/8217-action-du-club/switchLanguage/en).
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has “significant negative consequences for targeted 
debtor countries,” and “the failure of commercial 
creditors to commit to participation in the HIPC 
Initiative might also jeopardise the provision of debt 
relief under the HIPC and MDRI initiatives.”5 
On the other hand, private creditors complain 
that official lenders often receive more favourable 
restructuring terms. The Emerging Markets Traders 
Association, for example, argued that “inequity in the 
treatment of private and official bilateral claims allows 
bilateral creditors to continue to operate in a system that 
at times afforded them more favorable terms” (quoted 
in Mandeng 2004, 15). There is no question that the 
IMF and the Multilateral Development Banks receive 
preferential treatment because of their “preferred 
creditor status” (PCS). The IMF’s PCS is widely seen 
as compensation for the fact that it lends to risky, crisis-
ridden countries at low interest rates in order to provide 
the global public good of financial stability in times of 
crises, when no one else is willing to lend.
Still, the PCS has remained controversial. Its legal 
standing appears to be uncertain, and has been called 
into question (Raffer 2005). As noted earlier, giving 
PCS to the IMF may result in creditors who thought 
they were senior (and whose debt contracts may have 
said that) being moved down the priority chain, and 
5 See www.clubdeparis.org/sections/themes-strategiques/2009-8217-
action-du-club/8217-action-du-club/switchLanguage/en.
receiving more substantial haircuts than they otherwise 
would have received.6 
Private and public creditors do sometimes receive 
differential treatment during sovereign debt 
restructurings. The key questions are why and to 
what effect? In some cases, differential treatment may 
be justified if it contributes to the debtor’s economic 
recovery or global financial stability more broadly. In 
other cases, differential treatment complicates inter-
creditor bargaining and leads to inefficient and unfair 
outcomes.
EXPLICIT VERSUS IMPLICIT 
CREDITORS
Even in private debt restructurings, the list of claimants 
on a firm in bankruptcy includes not only its formal 
creditors (the holders of its long-term and short-term 
bonds and banks that have lent it money), but also 
both current workers, who are owed wages, and past 
workers, if the firm has promised them pensions. 
Domestic bankruptcy laws recognize these claimants 
and, in many cases, even give them priority.
In the case of sovereign debt restructurings, there can 
be a much longer list of “implicit” claimants, including, 
for instance, those who have made social security 
contributions in anticipation of retirement benefits. 
This leads to a fundamental question: who counts as 
a creditor? Standard practice suggests that sovereigns 
have three broad types of creditor: commercial, official 
6 To the extent that this has long been recognized as part of the international 
regime, there is no real change in property rights. On the other hand, a switch 
in regimes, for example from a bailout regime to a bail-in regime, can be 
thought of as a change in property rights. Even leaving aside inter-creditor 
distributional issues, the continued value of the PCS has been called into 
question, as the IMF’s decision to amend its “exceptional access” lending 
framework to deal with the Greek crisis could undermine the ability of 
the IMF to catalyze private lending and hence to resolve debt crises timely 
(Schadler 2014).
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bilateral and official multilateral. But sovereigns are a 
very unique type of debtor, and we need to think more 
deeply about who funds them. Sovereign debtors are 
governments; as such, they have obligations not only to 
their explicit creditors (bondholders and foreign official 
lenders), but also to their implicit creditors (pensioners 
and taxpayers more generally). The social contract is 
every bit as important as the formal creditor contracts.  
Pensioners and taxpayers are creditors of the 
government whose claims are typically affected by the 
terms of a sovereign debt restructuring; yet, they have 
no seat at the negotiating table and thus no say over 
those terms. 
How much representation should be given to these 
creditors in debt renegotiations? What is the best way 
of giving them representation? Just as there are different 
groups of explicit creditors, there are also different 
groups of pensioners — such as different age groups 
— whose interests can sometimes conflict. Creating 
fair representation within and across pensioner groups 
would thus have to be a cornerstone of any scheme to 
include them in debt negotiations.7
If these implicit creditors were explicitly recognized and 
treated as full-fledged creditors, how would this change 
debt restructuring negotiations? 
For one thing, it could make them more representative 
of the sovereign’s creditor base and thus, arguably, fairer 
and more equitable. Moreover, it could shift the relative 
balance of creditors in favour of those with a genuine 
stake in the sovereign’s full and speedy recovery. 
7 It should also be noted that it is easy to convert implicit creditors into 
formal creditors. Until now there has been little incentive to do so (and some 
disadvantages of doing so); however, the rules of aggregation may encourage 
countries to do so.  
In general, including these implicit creditors could prove 
beneficial by providing something of a counterweight 
to the creditors who do not necessarily have as strong 
an interest in the debtor’s well-being, such as those with 
large SCDS positions.
CACs
This brief has noted several inter-creditor problems 
that arise in debt renegotiations. It is important to note 
another: since sovereign bonds are typically restructured 
on a series-by-series basis, only a portion of a sovereign’s 
creditors are involved in any given restructuring. This 
implies a possible degree of inequity between different 
bondholders. A particularly egregious example has 
been exposed by the Argentine restructuring (although 
similar problems have occurred elsewhere in milder 
forms): the possibility of holdouts and vulture funds 
attempting to get for themselves better terms than 
others, under the threat of otherwise blocking the 
restructuring.
Recent US court decisions and changes in other 
provisions (the elimination of the champerty defence 
and in the span of sovereign immunity) have increased 
the difficulties of sovereign debt restructurings, as has 
the greater diversity of claimants over the past third of 
a century.  
At one point, some experts and policy makers were 
hopeful that CACs would resolve these problems, 
but more than a decade ago, this view was strongly 
questioned (for example, at the Initiative for Policy 
Dialogue Conference on Debt Restructuring at 
Columbia University in May 2002). The concerns of 
these critics have been borne out.  
For instance, if the CACs applied to each bond issue 
separability, it is relatively easy for specialized holdout 
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creditors to buy a “blocking position” within a single 
bond series and thwart an otherwise widely accepted 
restructuring agreement.  
Partly in response to earlier failures, the International 
Capital Markets Association (ICMA), the IMF and a few 
sovereign debtors have been promoting a new version 
of CACs with a stronger “aggregation” feature. As a 
recent IMF staff report (2014a, 1) states, “Broad support 
has emerged for CACs to include a ‘single limb’ voting 
procedure that will enable bonds to be restructured on 
the basis of a single vote across all affected instruments, 
subject to safeguards designed to ensure inter-
creditor equity and minimize the risk of sovereign 
manipulation.” 
These revamped clauses, adopted by Kazakhstan 
and Mexico, are intended to deal with this issue by 
aggregating and binding all bondholders to a single 
restructuring process.
However, as noted in the policy discussion below, there 
are many questions about how to go about aggregation 
— questions first raised more than a decade ago. How 
does one value bonds issued in different denominations? 
With different maturities? With different seniorities? 
How expansive is the list of creditors? Several key inter-
creditor issues — such as voting rights across different 
classes of creditors, or the potential for a majority to 
deprive minority creditors of their rights — are left 
unaddressed. 
They also fail to address ex ante issues or the “too little, 
too late” problem. In many quarters, there is concern 
over whether these issues can be solved in a way 
that is fair and equitable and that will lead to efficient 
restructuring — and in a way that can be easily and 
adequately incorporated into the debt contract itself.
Even if these new CACs are widely adopted, and even if 
they did provide an adequate resolution to the problems 
that have been identified going forward, it will take them 
at least a decade to work their way into the existing debt 
stock. 
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
All advanced economies have bankruptcy laws. 
Preserving inter-creditor equity in the restructuring or 
liquidation of a company is one of the main objectives of 
such laws. At the international level, however, the lack 
of a sovereign bankruptcy framework “complicates an 
orderly debt restructuring process between different 
and contractually unrelated creditor groups” (Mandeng 
2004, 10; see also Stiglitz 2002; Stiglitz et al. 2009). The 
absence of a strong bankruptcy framework also leads to 
costly delays in sovereign debt restructuring. 
In 2001, then IMF Deputy Managing Director Anne 
Krueger proposed the creation of a “sovereign debt 
restructuring mechanism” (SDRM), which would 
function as a bankruptcy procedure for sovereigns. 
After two years of lively discussion and debate, the 
SDRM was abandoned, partly because of opposition 
by the United States, which argued CACs were an 
efficient and sufficient alternative — although they 
were an alternative that no advanced country had 
chosen for resolving domestic restructurings, which 
are typically less complicated. CACs were also seen 
as a more politically feasible alternative. Recent events 
have shown, however, that the market-based approach 
does not go far enough and that a more comprehensive 
solution is still necessary and desirable (Stiglitz et al. 
2009). Testifying to the continued and widespread 
support for an SDRM-like arrangement, the UN General 
Assembly recently passed a resolution calling for the 
creation of a multilateral legal framework for sovereign 
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debt restructuring. However, despite these positive 
developments, many of the world’s most powerful 
countries — in particular those with advanced financial 
markets — still argue that tinkering with the market-
based approach, for example, by improving CACs and 
by introducing more explicit language concerning pari 
passu will do the trick. They continue to oppose more 
comprehensive reforms, meaning that the struggle for a 
more robust framework for sovereign debt restructuring 
will be tough and protracted. In the meantime, there are 
a number of sensible policy measures that can begin to 
address some of the key issues outlined in this brief. 
Four policy considerations are advanced: 
• Tighter regulation of SCDS contracts. Rules 
prohibiting the speculative use of SCDS contracts 
should be considered beyond the European Union. 
Some experts raise legitimate concerns that an EU-
style ban could itself cause instability by impairing 
the liquidity of the market. Still, the concerns raised 
in this brief suggest that policy makers should 
not ignore the potential for SCDSs to disrupt 
sovereign debt markets and complicate sovereign 
debt restructurings. The speculative use of these 
instruments should be closely monitored and 
evaluated.
At the very least, bondholders should also be 
required to disclose their SCDS positions. This 
would reduce information asymmetries and help 
bring about a more transparent environment for 
inter-creditor and creditor-debtor bargaining. By 
revealing any conflicts of interest, disclosure policies 
could contribute to more effective negotiation 
strategies among those with common goals and 
pave the way for stronger rules to neutralize 
“spoilers.” Providers of sovereign default insurance 
could also be given a seat at the negotiating table 
to counterbalance the weight of SCDS holders 
and help facilitate a positive resolution. Although 
perhaps difficult to operationalize, SCDS contracts 
could also be designed to include provisions that 
exclude from coverage any bondholder whose 
actions played a “pivotal role” in triggering default. 
SCDS regulations could thus be introduced through 
legislation or contractual innovation.8
• A greater role for debt reprofiling and bondholder 
aggregation. A recent IMF staff report (IMF 2014b) 
examines the benefits of using debt reprofiling — 
rather than bailouts or outright debt reductions — in 
cases where there is genuine uncertainty regarding 
the sustainability of a country’s public debt in the 
medium term. Reprofiling has several merits, one of 
which is the more equitable treatment of short-term 
and long-term creditors. Under a reprofiling, short-
term claims will face greater disruption than longer-
term claims, but the distributional implications will 
be less stark than in the cases of outright bailouts or 
deep debt restructurings. Moreover, the aggregation 
clauses contained in the new model of CACs could 
be a strong mechanism for promoting inter-creditor 
equity in future debt restructurings, although it 
should be acknowledged that these clauses could 
also create new inter-creditor problems if they 
were used by the majority to deprive creditors of 
their rights. Still, this is perhaps a lesser evil to the 
opposite scenario, whereby a minority hijacks and 
derails good faith negotiations to the detriment of 
majority creditors, the debtor and global financial 
stability.9 
8  The provisions of this paragraph need to apply broadly, for example, to 
affiliates of those with a seat at the bargaining table.  
9  We recall, however, the problems noted earlier in formulating an 
equitable aggregation clause.  
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• The development of common rules and norms 
for valuing public and private concessions in 
sovereign debt restructurings. Developing a set of 
rules and norms to assess public-private creditor 
equity could contribute to more cooperative ex ante 
and ex post debt management strategies between 
commercial and official creditors. Such rules should 
focus on the key issue of what interest rate to use 
when valuing different concessions.10 Agreed-upon 
rules could be established as soft law within an 
international organization or as a set of principles 
within a broadly accepted code of conduct. As 
part of this rethinking, there should once again be 
a reconsideration of the desirability of bailouts and 
the IMF’s de facto PCS. 
• The establishment of greater creditor rights 
for implicit creditors. Sovereign debtors could 
consider establishing special roles and rights 
for their implicit creditors in a way that allows 
the latter to directly represent their interests in 
debt restructuring negotiations. Doing so could 
strengthen inter-creditor equity and give greater 
voice to creditors who have a strong interest in the 
debtor’s economic well-being. 
10  The choice of interest rate affects not only equity among creditors, but 
also equity between the borrower and creditors. Lenders to risky sovereigns 
receive high interest rates to compensate them for the risk of default. The new 
bonds issued in a good restructuring, which has substantially lowered the 
default rate, should accordingly carry with them a much lower interest rate. 
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